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Abstract
Over the past five years, the European Commission has undergone what are probably the most significant reforms since its
inception. The article provides a brief review and assessment of these administrative reforms, before looking at the political
changes and challenges arising from the processes of constitutionalisation and enlargement. The entry of ten new Member
States in particular has created additional pressures and demands, but also provides new opportunities to review and revise
the workings of the Commission to enable it to adapt to an enlarged Union. This article sets out to examine the position of
the Commission at this important juncture. It looks at the ongoing process of internal reforms in the European Commission
and assesses their impact on the institution, considers the process of treaty reform and its implications for the Commission,
and then reviews the wider impact of enlargement on the Commission and on the European Union as a whole. By way of
conclusion, we assess the current and future challenges facing the incoming Commission under its new President Barroso.
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Introduction
Over the past five years, the European Commission has
undergone what are probably the most significant
reforms since its inception. This is remarkable, given the
expansion of tasks and size that the Commission had
experienced over the previous decades. It took the crisis
of 1999, when the Commission took the decision to
resign rather than face an inevitable censure by the
European Parliament, to suddenly thrust reform to the
top of the political agenda. Given the implicit recognition
at the time that the Prodi Commission would be judged
on its ability to reform the Commission, it is legitimate
now, at the end of its term, to question the extent to which
this objective has been achieved. Beyond the long-
standing need to reform the Commission and take
account of its greater size and wider competences,
Commission reform is also, and perhaps even more so,
a response to the recent round of enlargement. The entry
of ten new Member States has created additional pressures
and demands, but also new opportunities to review and
revise the workings of the Commission to enable it to
adapt to an enlarged Union.
This article sets out to examine the position of the
Commission at this important juncture. It will first look
at the ongoing process of internal reforms in the European
Commission and assess their impact on the institution.
Second, it will consider the process of treaty reform and
its implications on the Commission. Third, the wider
impact of enlargement on the European Union is
reviewed, with particular emphasis on the way in which
this process affects the position of the Commission. By
way of conclusion, we assess the current and future
challenges facing the Barroso Commission.
The Kinnock Reforms
When the Prodi Commission approached the issue of
reform, many of the key problems identified in the
Spierenberg report of 1979 – such as size of the Com-
mission, political influence of the Cabinets and legi-
timacy – were still relevant in 1999. An over-simplistic
assessment was that the Commission system seemed to be
based on a French centralised administration, a German
control system and an Italian model of trade unions.
The case for modernization of the Commission arose
primarily from the fact that, whilst Europe and the Union
had altered hugely in four decades, the Commission’s
organisational systems had hardly changed. The reason
for this was not difficult to see. Policy advance and
application were necessarily the greatest preoccupations
of an institution that was explicitly created for those
purposes, and the Commission – as the motor of European
integration – has attempted to fulfil those functions. The
emphasis had essentially been on the concept of
‘Administration de mission’. Further impetus to reform
came from two external factors. The first was the
expansion in the scale and scope of the Commission’s
tasks. As an example, at the beginning of the 1990’s
there was an explosion of direct management of funds
in the field of external economic assistance. The second
reason for change was that the EU was approaching its
largest and most complex enlargement. The strains on
the functioning of the Commission as an organisation,
and the new demands being made on the institution,
made fundamental overhaul essential.
In March 2000 the Commission adopted a Reform
Strategy White Paper which set out three related themes
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• The complete modernization of financial manage-
ment and control (establishment of a specialist
Internal Audit service and audit capacities in each
Directorate General);
• Introduction of Strategic Planning and Programming
using Activity Based Management and Budgeting
to achieve a more efficient and transparent annual
focus on the main operational priorities and their
operational consequences;
• Modernization of personnel policy and a new Human
Resources strategy (e.g. new staff regulations
including an appraisal system, new linear career
structure and increased budget for training and
management training).
A constant stream of proposals over the last four years
included the adoption of a global package of reforms to
staff policy and career structure in December 2001 and
January 2002, followed by the successful reform of the
new staff regulations which came into force on 1 May
2004. These proposals have been portrayed as the most
comprehensive programme of modernisation in the
Commission’s 45-year history. They are seen as a com-
prehensive strategy of integrated change, which encom-
passes all aspects of the
Commission’s structure,
systems of working and
administrative methods.
Overall, it cannot be
doubted that the complete
modernisation of financial
management and control
has been largely successful
in achieving its aims. More
remains to be done on sim-
plification of procedures,
but the financial manage-
ment of the institution has
improved markedly over the last five years.
The second block of reforms, with the introduction of
strategic planning and programming, has been a partial
success, but a question mark remains over its long-term
viability. This process has led to a more strategic approach
within the Commission, which in turn has helped to
develop a more effective inter-institutional planning
mechanism. The reality remains, however, that the
Commission has failed in its efforts to concentrate on a
small number of political priorities. The attempt to identify
‘negative priorities’ which should be removed from the
work programme has produced limited results due to the
reluctance of individual Directorates General. The Com-
mission must also do more to ensure that the College of
Commissioners looks forward strategically, rather than
being bogged down with day-to-day decisions.
Modernization of personnel policy was always going
to be the most difficult area to succeed in. On 22 March
2004, the Council adopted the Commission’s proposals
on the modernization of the Staff Regulations. These
reforms cover all aspects of careers and working conditions
of EU officials and other staff, from recruitment to
retirement. At the heart of the system is a new career
structure centred on two categories of staff: Administrators
and Assistants. The new Staff Regulations, among other
things, update pension provisions by raising the pension-
able age and pension contributions; rationalize various
allowances; improve the mechanisms for the reporting of
wrongdoing; sustain merit based remuneration; and
modernize the working environment of staff. It is estimated
that the reforms will generate cost savings of up to  100
million a year over the next decade. This in itself has led
to the suggestion that the new Staff Regulations
discriminate against those officials, especially from the
new Member States, who joined after 1 May 2004.
The problem seems to be that, although most of the
reforms have been implemented, they have tended to
focus on accountability and control mechanisms rather
than on a reform-based approach bringing the staff with
them. Indeed, the internal reform process is widely seen
to have sapped the morale of officials throughout the
Commission. One of the main concerns amongst staff
seems to be that many of the – otherwise welcome –
reforms have added additional tasks to an increasingly
heavy workload, and the reform process has developed
numerous evaluation mechanisms without simplifying
procedures or providing a
clearer sense of the demands
being placed on the unit or
the individual concerned.
The many changes resul-
ting from the reforms have
also induced a higher degree
of uncertainty over the
future location of staff, with
the distraction that that
creates both for the work of
units and for individual
officials. In a nutshell, the
Kinnock reforms imply
long-term benefits with prospects for a more efficient
operation of the Commission internally, but have also
created rather high short-term costs, and thus temporarily
added to, rather than solved, the Commission’s problems.
The Changing Politics of the
European Commission
A lack of clarity about the Commission’s role clearly
remains. It emanates from the conflicting functions the
Commission performs. The Treaties confer on the Com-
mission functions of legislative initiator, administrator,
policy manager in an ever-increasing number of areas,
legal watchdog, mediator, power broker, negotiator, and
external representative. In terms of its overall vocation,
these tasks underline a potential role as a proto-govern-
ment within a federal Europe. Commission President
Prodi made no secret of his desire to see the European
Commission regarded as a European government, and the
Constitutional Treaty does recognise its function as the
executive of the Union. However, political leadership
will need to be shared even more in the future with the
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Council, given the plans for a European Council President
who is bound to be a rival to the Commission President
in terms of the representation of the Union vis-à-vis
citizens, Member States and third countries.
More than ever the Commission therefore finds itself
caught in the forcefield of the institutional triangle, with
an ever-closer relationship with the Council on the one
hand, but with ever-greater dependence on the European
Parliament on the other.
The Commission has always drawn its legitimacy
from a number of different sources – the support it receives
from the Member States who appoint its members, its
accountability towards the European Parliament and the
efficiency of its management of the Union’s affairs. Such
multiple sources of legitimacy place contradictory de-
mands on the Commission, and the institution has been
struggling in recent years to cope with these.
Greater politicisation – which was an accepted, if not
desired, outcome during the Prodi Presidency – may have
made the Commission more visible in the public eye, but
also made it more vulnerable to the attacks that come with
partisan politics. There is, in the long run, no hiding for
the Commission from the political nature of its work, and
the controversies that may
arise from that. What is pro-
blematic in this respect is,
however, the Commission’s
reliance on both Council
and European Parliament,
not only in order to achieve
results in the legislative
process, but also in terms of
its wider public acceptance.
The events surrounding
the Barroso Commission’s
appointment in late 2004
illustrate this well: a Com-
mission nominated unani-
mously – and after lengthy
deliberations – by the Member States proved to be
unacceptable to the European Parliament, forcing the
designated President to withdraw his team just before the
Parliamentary vote. While this was widely seen as a
‘crisis’, even a ‘constitutional crisis’, Barroso’s ability to
reshuffle his team relatively quickly, satisfying the de-
mands of both Member States and EP, could even be seen
to have strengthened him as President. If Barroso’s
decisiveness and diplomatic skill during this process of
Commission nomination and approval is anything to go
by, this is going to be a Commission with firmer and
clearer leadership, and thus a contrast to the previous one.
Clearly the ‘crisis’ surrounding the Parliamentary
approval of the Barroso Commission was the result of a
continuing compromise in the Union’s institutional
arrangements, in this case the choice to base the Com-
mission’s appointment on the support of both Member
States and Parliamentary majority. In this respect, the
provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, under which the
Commission President would be elected by the European
Parliament and have greater freedom over the appointment
of Commissioners, would do away with this particular
problem. On the other hand, the Commission and
individual Commissioners will be weakened by not
having the close working relationship with national
governments and administrations that has been important
for the Commission until now.
If one considers this link between national and
European executives has being important, if not essential,
for effective governance in the EU, the provisions in the
Constitutional Treaty regarding the number of Commis-
sioners are a further test of this source of legitimacy: from
2014 the College of Commissioners is to consist of only
two-thirds of the number of Member States. At any one
time, a third of Member States will not have ‘their’
Commissioner in Brussels. In many ways this de-linking
of Commission and Member State is overdue, considering
it is only a logical consequence of the requirement of
neutrality and independence from national interests that
has always been expected from the Commission. But in
terms of making sure that the work of the Commission –
and indeed the activity of the EU as a whole – is com-
municated well to national governments, administra-
tions and indeed the public, this change in the number of
Commissioners could well
be detrimental if the inter-
locutor between Brussels
and the national domain is
lacking. All the more reason
for the Commission to deve-
lop a communication poli-
cy that is equally effective
in presenting the work of
the Commission at the
European level as in relating
to the different national
spheres within which EU
policies will continue to be
received and evaluated.
One of the criticisms of
the Prodi Commission has been its failure to provide
political leadership and a clear message. Both of these
will be in high demand in a more diverse Union. The larger
the Union grows, and the more variable geometries –
including competing groups of Member States – that
emerge, the more important it is to preserve and strengthen
an institutional ‘centre of gravity’. Thus there is a powerful
functional argument for ensuring that the Commission
remains at the core of the common institutional framework.
However, it will require greater flexibility in the future not
only to manage inter-institutional relations with the
Council and Parliament, but also to make effective use of
the European Council. In this context it needs to be
recognised that the European Council as a forum has
largely been replaced by constant bilateral contacts
between individual Member States, from which the Com-
mission has been largely excluded.
The general trend is therefore towards greater poli-
ticization, involving an increasing importance of the
Commission’s relations with the European Parliament
and a more delicate link between national and European
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domains. It is in line with the long-standing tensions
facing the Commission that maintaining an independent
stance vis-à-vis national governments and political
pressures is becoming more important just as it is proving
more difficult to achieve. The legacy of the Prodi
Commission is clearly that the legitimacy of the Com-
mission relies ever more on input (i.e. on the political
interests that provide the foundation of its work), rather
than on its output (i.e. the provision of effective solutions
to the problems facing European society and economy).
The Commission’s Role in the Wider Europe
In considering the position of the Commission in the
enlarged European Union, we need to look not only at
the direct impact this has had on the Commission as an
institution, but also at the changes which enlargement
brings to the European Union as a whole. Indirectly,
enlargement has a significant impact on the Commission,
both in terms of the demands placed on it, and in terms
of the new constraints and opportunities it creates for the
Commission.
First of all, this concerns the simple fact of size: the
EU has grown significantly in terms of population,
territory and economy,
with a greater diversity of
all three. However, the
Commission has not grown
accordingly. Some recruit-
ment, as discussed below,
is going on, but it is not
likely to increase the size
of the Commission propor-
tionately for some time. Ob-
viously, there are econo-
mies of scale, and one
would not expect a 1:1 growth of the Commission with
the entry of the new Member States.
However, some tasks for the Commission can be
expected to grow disproportionately post-enlargement.
Here one would expect the Commission to have to do
much more, simply to remain at the level at which it has
been in the past. One of these areas is control over
implementation. There is a backlog of implementation
of the acquis in the new Member States (not to mention
the remaining candidate countries). Beyond that, the
Commission now has a much more difficult job to
supervise the correct transposition and application of
Community laws in the Union. The administrative
resources of the new Member States will also take time
to come up to the levels of Western Europe, and thus
there will continue to be limited capacities to implement
EU policies. This implementation challenge in the new
Member States comes on top of an already problematic
implementation culture among the old Member States.
Indeed, in some ways it is fair to say that the problems
with implementation in the EU 15 have grown. The
Stability Pact, and the way in which some of the core
countries have had problems complying with it, has
been the most visible example. Such demonstrations of
non-compliance send signals to all Member States, old
and new, and may lead over time to a further erosion of
the implementation culture in the EU.
With resources not having increased substantially,
it is easy to see that the Commission here has a mammoth
task. Recourse to litigation is not always a useful option,
given the overload of the European Court of Justice.
Perhaps it just needs to be recognised that implementation
will be one of the areas in which the EU will pay the price
for its simultaneous widening and deepening over the
past decade. In some ways these are the signs of a
potentially overstretched Union that will have to devote
some attention to consolidation and persuasion – in
particular within domestic systems. This is where the
input of the Commission will be required, and the search
for new and effective instruments to manage governance
in this wider Union may have to go beyond the White
Paper on European Governance.
Part of the answer appears to lie in processes of de-
centralization, of the Commission handing back powers
to either national administrations or independent
agencies. It is a trend that has gone on for some time, but
which has been accelerating over the past few years. In
areas such as competition policy the Commission is
looking for a new division
of labour with the Member
States, thus casting off some
of the load that has grown
beyond its own resources.
The desired effect would
be that, by concentrating
on a reduced number of
issues and cases, DG Com-
petition can be swifter and
more effective in its own
decision-making.
We have also witnessed a growing trend of setting up
new agencies which do some of the work of gathering
and exchanging information, building up sectoral
networks and assisting in implementation – tasks that
were traditionally located inside the Commission. Indeed
we may see agencies taking over from the Commission
the centralized implementation of EU policies, relie-
ving the Commission of its management tasks and thus
freeing resources for policy-making and agenda-setting,
where the Commission has been rather weak over the
past few years. Indeed, a process of decentralization
should strengthen the Commission and help return it to
its traditional role of providing strategic leadership for
the Union.
Future Challenges:
The Agenda of the Barroso Commission
Looking to the future and the challenges ahead, it is
clear that the reform process is far from over. Apart from
the implementation of the changes required by the
Constitutional Treaty, if and when that is ratified, the
new Commission also needs to manage the institutional
impact of enlargement. This concerns inter alia the
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impact which the recruitment of officials from the new
Member States will have on the nature of the Commis-
sion’s administration. There is, for example, the likely
impact on language, with much greater use of English
rather than the traditional French among new recruits.
The whole culture of language use will be affected, both
in terms of fewer languages used in internal meetings
and documents (these already feature almost only French
and English) and in terms of pressure on Commission
staff to keep documents requiring translation as short as
possible. Thus the counter intuitive effect of the arrival
of new nationalities among the Commission staff, and
the increase in the number of official languages may
actually be a rationalization of language use inside the
Commission.
Similarly, one should also expect the arrival of new
administrative cultures to challenge the traditional mo-
dus operandi in the Commission. This will most likely
be a gradual change, but over time there is the expectation
that the Commission will be transformed by thousands
of new staff from Central and Eastern Europe. However,
what the medium- to long-term impact of the arrival of
different administrative traditions will be is difficult to
predict. On the one hand, it may exacerbate the already
fragmented nature of the Commission. Thus, a significant
number of new staff with a very different culture of
public administration may make a mark on the insti-
tution, just as the arrival of a wave of officials from
Sweden led to a push for greater transparency in the work
of the Commission. On the other hand, the new
nationalities in the Commission may ‘dilute’ the existing
patterns of different national cultures, providing better
chances of the development of a genuine European
administrative culture.
At the political level, the incorporation of the new
Commissioners from the ten new Member States is
already having an influence on the way the Commission
works. This is not just a question of languages and
culture as discussed above. In the debate in the College
in the first six months after 1 May 2004, the dynamics
of discussions on issues like competitiveness and the
European Social Model were affected because of the
positions taken by Commissioners from the new Member
States. As they gain experience and use the power some
have obtained from Vice-President and key portfolio
positions, this influence is set to increase.
President Barroso’s first significant decision was to
reject proposals advocating a radical re-structuring of
the Commission and a strengthened role for the larger
Member States. He resisted calls for the introduction of
clusters of Commissioners at the level of the College and
for the splitting of different Directorates-General.
Barroso sent a clear signal to the larger Member
States that they would not control his Commission. He
intentionally resisted the pressure to give the largest and
most prestigious portfolios to France, Germany, Italy,
the United Kingdom or Poland. He also decided that all
members of the Commission will return to the renovated
Berlaymont rather than remain with their Directorate-
General, thus reversing one of the changes Prodi had
initiated when he took over in 2000.
Very early on, Barroso set about providing clear
instructions to Commissioners on the areas they would
be responsible for and what he hoped each would
achieve. Barroso has worked hard to be inclusive and
provide Commissioners with a sense of ownership over
the policy agenda being formed. At a first informal
seminar of the designated President and Commissioners
in August 2004, a new Code of Conduct for Commis-
sioners was provisionally agreed setting out the rules on
independence and Commissioners’ relationships with
their departments. These new rules consolidate the
previous Codes already adopted under the Prodi
Commission. A number of subtle changes have been
made, and new rules have also been set out on the make-
up of the private offices of Commissioners. Barroso has
also made it clear that he will demand the resignation of
a Commissioner if and when necessary.
In the first few months after his appointment, Barroso
has therefore already demonstrated better communi-
cation skills than his predecessor. He has also taken the
long overdue step of appointing a Vice-President for
institutional relations and communication strategy. The
appointment of a new President also inevitably brings
with it a renewed optimism amongst the staff of the
Commission. Many staff seem to be looking for strong
leadership from the President and consolidation and
simplification of procedures, rather than a new bout of
reforms. President Barroso will quickly have to decide
which approach he intends to take on reform.
In fact, the European Union of 2004 has a completely
different dynamic to the post-Santer Commission atmo-
sphere in 1999. The focus has shifted from internal
reform to the question of the role, credibility and ability
of the Commission to function in a Union of 25. The
Commission will have to adapt to the changing political
dynamics stemming from the incorporation of the ten
new Member States, not least by understanding the
influence they will have internally.
Political leadership by the Commission will be more
important than ever if a President of the European
Council is established and a new Vice-President for
external relations is created within the Commission.
Perhaps the greatest change facing the new President
and his team of Commissioners is to regain trust and
credibility with the Member States, while at the same
time harnessing the increased politicization of the
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